Kennedy and Khruschev The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 is widely considered to be the moment when the Cold War between the U.S.A. And the U.S.S.R. came closest to outright hostility and indeed nuclear war. What is most interesting about the Cuban Missile Crisis in retrospect is its strategic handling by the two national leaders involved, Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy. I hope by an examination of the correspondence exchanged by these two leaders during the period to demonstrate that Kennedy's handling of the crisis, while marked by some errors, was more responsible than Khrushchev's. In some sense, the Cuban Missile Crisis began as an irresponsible gamble by Khrushchev: if he exhibited some clever statesmanship during the crisis, this does not erase the fact that it was begun by him as an attempt to take advantage of a perceived weakness on Kennedy's part that was not ultimately there.

The Russian decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba -- which was allied to the U.S.S.R. after Fidel Castro's revolution had made Cuba into a Communist state in the late 1950s -- followed the ill-advised Bay of Pigs invasion earlier in Kennedy's administration. Thus Khrushchev was capable of claiming an immediate provocation that had made necessary the boost to Cuba's defense capability. However Khrushchev chose to...

would treat interference by European powers (including Russia) in the Americas as an act of aggression. That is why Kennedy's initial communication of October 22, 1962 to Khrushchev frames the Cuban missiles in terms of the security of the hemisphere: "At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere" (60). While being careful not to allow the provocation to start an immediate outright war, Kennedy nevertheless articulates the problem with the missiles as being related not to the ideological concerns of the Cold War, but to an American security policy that pre-dated Communism and nuclear weaponry altogether.
What is most remarkable about Khrushchev's responses to Kennedy during the crisis is the high level of rhetorical mockery, casuistry, and outright rodomontade which -- however amusing at times, and however occasionally accurate in its specifics -- hardly indicates responsible statecraft. On October 24, Khruschev claims that "the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism" (63). Khrushchev's telegram of…